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Abstract
Presidential democracies were 4.9 times more likely to default on
external debts between 1976 and 2000 than parliamentary democra-
cies. This paper argues that the explanation to the pattern of serial
defaults among a number of sovereign borrowers lies in their consti-
tutions. Ceteris paribus, parliamentary democracies are less likely
to default on their liabilities as the confidence requirement creates a
credible link between economic policies and the political survival of the
executive. This link tends to strengthen the repayment commitment
when politicians are opportunistic. I show that this eﬀect is large and
statistically significant in the contemporary world even when compari-
son is restricted to countries that are twins in terms of colonial origin,
geography and economic variables. Moreover, the result persists if
OECD or Latin American democracies are excluded from the sample.
Since the form of government of a country is typically chosen at the
time of independence and highly persistent over time, constitutions
can explain why debt policies in developing countries are related to
individual histories.
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1 Introduction
What explains the fact that historically some countries have been more prone
to default on their financial obligations than others? Why has Venezuela de-
faulted 9 times on its external debts and Mexico 8 times over the last 180
years while India, Malaysia and Thailand have never done so? (Reinhart
and Rogoﬀ (2004)). 1 This paper finds that the critical aspect to answer
this question is found in a borrowing country’s constitutional form of gov-
ernment. More specifically, democracies in which the executive needs the
continuous consent of the legislature to remain in power, i.e. parliamentary
democracies, are less likely to default on their external liabilities. The thrust
of this argument is present in earlier work by North and Weingast (1989)
on the evolution of political institutions in 17th century England. The ra-
tionale is based on the fact that the vote of confidence requirement found
in parliamentary democracies creates a credible link between debt policy de-
cisions and the survival of the executive. It is this credible link that leads
to the possibility of compensating oﬀers between opportunistic politicians
within a parliamentary cabinet. Such compensation mechanisms will act to
reduce the rescheduling probability of a parliamentary government vis-‘a-vis
a presidential government. The contribution of this study is to show that
this eﬀect is large and statistically significant in the contemporary world:
the estimates suggest that if the legislature could pose a credible threat to
1See also Reinhart, Rogoﬀ and Savastano (2003).
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unseat sovereigns through a confidence motion the probability of default in a
25 year period in presidential democracies would be reduced from the current
79.3% to less than 33%. As shown in the paper, this holds even when we
use matching techniques to restrict comparison to twin countries - i.e. coun-
tries with similar colonial origin, geographical and economic characteristics.
Hence, the reason that history is of primary importance for debt policy 2
might come from the persistence of the constitutional form of government of
the borrowing countries.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly explains the theoreti-
cal hypothesis. Section 3 analyses 72 contemporary democracies that have
access to private credit markets, showing that North and Weingast’s pre-
diction that parliamentary democracies are less likely to default on external
debt repayments is indeed borne out in the data. I show that this pattern
was already present in the data before each of the world wars. In the con-
temporaneous sample, it is shown that parliamentary democracies are found
to be substantially less likely to default on their liabilities irrespective of
whether Latin American or OECD countries are excluded from the sample
or not. The paper recognizes that the main empirical limitation of compar-
ative studies that rely on such fundamental pillars of a constitution as the
form of government is that there are few instances of democratic changes in
these to allow a more precise identification with standard techniques. 3 This
2See Lindert and Morton (1989) and Reinhart, Rogoﬀ and Savastano (2003).
3Institutions in this paper are constraints on rulers in the sense of North (1981). The
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is why section 4 resorts to quasi-experimental methods, aiming at insulating
the form of government from other factors such as the colonial origin, loca-
tion or income level of a country. Even though higher standard errors result
from matching techniques, the diﬀerence between regimes remains large and
statistically significant. Section 5 then proceeds to find that parliamentary
democracies have reduced their external debts in more market friendly ways:
only one among five parliamentary democracies that attained a reduction in
the debt to GNP ratio in excess of 25% within a three-year-period resorted to
a default - compared to more than 80% of presidential democracies in similar
circumstances. Parliamentary democracies as Botswana, Malaysia, Papua
New Guinea and Thailand attained such marked debt reductions without
changing original terms of debt contracts. Finally, the paper concludes by
discussing directions for further research.
2 Theoretical Rationale
The theoretical hypothesis of this paper claims that when politicians have
conflicting interests in the decision of whether to continue servicing exter-
nal debt or not, the institutional setting in which such a decision would
ultimately be taken will condition the outcome. In particular, it will be cru-
fact that the form of government rarely changes and is typically inherited from the colonial
past implies that this institution is largely unaﬀected by the contemporaneous vagaries of
tastes. Arguably then, the form of government is one of the deep parameters that Glaeser
et al. (2004) suggest should be used in institutional studies.
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cial whether the political survival of the executive that takes such decision
depends or not on other politicians. Parliamentary democracies are those
regimes in which the executive (the prime-minister) can be unseated by the
legislature through a confidence motion. In contrast, the Constitution of
presidential countries does not include such possibility. 4 This distinction is
likely to make a prime-minister give much greater consideration to the eﬀects
of an important policy change on his support basis in the legislature than a
president would do. As a result, the probability of default in a presidential
regime will typically be higher than that seen in parliamentary regimes when
asset holders can sway the legislative chamber. To see this, assume that
a debt default has consequences on the economy which will put downward
pressure on asset values. 5 If the owners of assets who would be negatively
aﬀected in the case of discontinuance of debt service have higher stakes in
debt policy than those who do not hold such assets, compensation mech-
anisms among political actors will tend to reduce the likelihood of a debt
rescheduling.
Take the example of a parliamentary government formed by a prime-
4Presidents can be impeached, but only if there are established criminal charges against
them. The paper follows Persson and Tabellini (2003), that distinguish form of govern-
ments based on the confidence requirement.
5In fact, this seems to have been the case in heavily indebtded Argentina in 1999.
Stock markets fell 8% in one day when one of the contenders for the presidential position
announced that he was considering to halt external debt servicing. Later, in December
2001, the already depressed stock market fell a further 8% after the inauguration speech
of the short-lived president Rodriguez Saa in which he stated: Vamos a tomar el toro por
las astas, vamos a hablar de la deuda externa. En primer lugar, anuncio que el Estado
argentino suspenderá el pago de la deuda externa.
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minister and a junior coalition partner - the latter proxying for the prime-
minister’s support basis in the legislature. The junior partner may at anytime
abandon the government, leading to a government dissolution followed by a
new government formation. Assume for the moment that the prime-minister
represents asset holders and therefore is strongly opposed to a debt reschedul-
ing, whereas the pivotal junior coalition partner represents peasants. Since
continuing to service external debt under current conditions implies negative
international transfers, peasants would prefer to halt debt servicing (note
that since peasants are assumed not to hold assets, it is natural that their
optimizing horizons be shorter, as they will internalize the long term conse-
quences of a default to a lesser extent). In such a situation, the prime-minister
could buy the critical support of the peasant politician by giving him, for
instance, a ministry in the portfolio. Since the benefits are directly linked to
the survival of the government, such a transfer could eliminate the incentives
of the junior coalition partner to unseat the debt servicing government. In-
terestingly, if the types of politicians are not perfectly observable before they
have implemented policy themselves, all junior coalition partners would be
able to extract side payments from the senior government member.
Now consider instead that the prime-minister is a peasant. The simple
knowledge that with some probability a junior coalition member represents
the interests of stakeholders - who would loose out heavily if a default were
declared - will act as a deterrent to the implementation of such a policy,
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as it might put the political survival of the government at risk. A default
would reveal the type of the head of government and hence possibly lead
his support basis to draw a new politician from the pool of candidates to
form a government. In contrast, in a presidential democracy, any threat by
Congress members to systematically oppose bill proposals of the executive
in case its preferred debt policy is not implemented would not be subgame
perfect: once the president has defaulted on debt contracts, legislators would
find it optimal to take this decision as a bygone. 6 Obviously, the distinction
between constitutional forms of government will only be relevant for countries
in which there is an alternative to the incumbent government, i.e. where the
threat of unseating the government is credible. This is why in the empirical
section the comparison of Constitutions is limited to countries in which there
are indications of political freedom.
Douglass North and Barry Weingast (1989) examine one of the rare cases
in which such fundamental pillar of the Constitution as the form of govern-
ment did change. They argue, that in 17th century England the empower-
ment of parliament during the Glorious Revolution resulted from a necessity
of the Crown to raise funds to finance its wars. Reluctant creditors - who
had already seen several unilateral changes in repayment terms - only came
back to the market once the Parliament finally obtained the power to unseat
6Note that with opportunistic politicians, only the proportion of legislators that favours
debt servicing is of relevance. Since asset holders have stronger incentives to enter into
politics than peasants and pre-electoral announcements are "cheap talk", the proportions
are unlikely to be the same in the cohort of politicians and the cohort of voters.
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the sovereign that stepped too far out of the line (North and Weingast (1989,
p.829). Kohlscheen (2004) formalizes this argument in an analytical model
showing that, due to the credible link between policies and the political sur-
vival of the executive, debt defaults are less likely to happen in parliamentary
democracies than in presidential ones under very general conditions.
3 Empirical Evidence
In order to test the conjecture that parliamentary democracies have a lower
propensity to default on foreign debts, economic and political data were ob-
tained for 72 democracies. The sample includes all countries that satisfied the
following two criteria: a) obtained at least once a credit rating at one of the
two major rating agencies; b) have an average index of political freedom and
civil liberties that corresponds to a free or partially free democracy according
to Freedom House. The first restriction is intended to exclude countries that
have not signalled an interest in accessing private debt markets by request-
ing a sovereign debt rating and might be primarily involved in dealings with
multilateral institutions. The complete list of countries, their default history
and form of government classification can be found at the end of the paper.
To identify which countries have defaulted on their external debts be-
tween 1976 and 2000, two alternative indicators are used. The first indicator
is from the rating agency Standard & Poor’s and flags any change in the
original terms of the contract. The second indicator, due to Detragiache and
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Spilimbergo (2000), flags countries only when there have been substantial ar-
rears in repayments (i.e. in excess of 5% of the debt stock). Also, in contrast
to the first indicator, this index includes defaults on commercial debts. I
shall refer to episodes identified by the first indicator as technical defaults or
simply defaults and by substantial defaults when using the second indicator.
7 Finally, I use the form of government classification by Persson and Tabellini
(2003). They classify a country as parliamentary if the Constitution of the
country empowers the legislature to unseat the executive.
Table 1 summarizes the information found in the list of countries at the
end of the paper. The diﬀerence is striking: whereas only 7 out of the 43
parliamentary democracies in the sample had a credit incident during the 25
years of the sample period, no less than 23 of the 29 presidential countries
did so. Since most of the democracies throughout Latin America have presi-
dential regimes, I also report the proportions when Latin America is dropped
from the sample. The pattern persists: 5 defaulters among 38 parliamentary
democracies against 7 in the group of 11 presidential democracies. Finally,
the table shows that parliamentary countries also seem less likely to default
when we restrict the sample to the developing world. In what follows, I
report regression results when the technical default variable is used as the
7Detragiache and Spilimbergo’s indicator tends to be more permissive towards borrow-
ers. For instance, while the two authors suggest that Bolivia and Jamaica never had any
debt crisis, Standard & Poor’s considers that each of them defaulted at least twice. Look-
ing at the more recent cases, only S&P considers that the rescheduling process of Pakistan
in 1999 and Russia in 2000 was preceeded by a default. Detragiache and Spilimbergo
however also include commercial defaults, and therefore consider that South Korea and
Thailand both defaulted in 1998.
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dependent variable. Table 1 shows that the diﬀerence between regimes in
the unconditional probabilities of default is even larger for the substantial
default indicator.
[Table 1 about here]
Interestingly, as shown at the end of Table 1, the striking diﬀerence in
default probabilities was already a characteristic of the two pre-war periods
of 1880-1913 and 1919-1938. 8 Table 2 lists the 17 countries that were
already independent and democratic during these periods. Even though here
we are dealing with a very small sample, with 10 out of 11 parliamentary
democracies maintaining a clean-sheet during these periods the hypothesis
that the form of government does not aﬀect the unconditional probability
of default is rejected with a t-value of 2.93 (p=0.01). However, whereas a
pattern of serial defaults is evident for some presidential countries in the
table at the end of the paper, a clear-cut identification of what drives the
diﬀerence between the groups during the pre-war period is complicated by
two factors. First, the pre-war sample is almost prohibitively small if one
considers that regime changes are very rare and most of the variation comes
from the cross-sectional dimension and, second, apart from Switzerland and
the U.S., there was a perfect correlation between the form of government
and the Latin American dummy variable before World War II. Developing
8Here Lindert and Morton (1989) and Suter (1990) are used for the identification of
defaults.
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presidential countries outside of Latin America that have become democracies
only did so after WWII, whereas countries in Latin America that have a
parliamentary Constitution only became independent after the war. For this
reason I shall focus on the last quarter of the 20th century in the next section.
[Table 2 about here]
3.1 Cross-Sectional Logit Analysis
Table 4 shows the marginal eﬀects at the mean of the covariates obtained
with a logit regression when the usual economic determinants of debt de-
faults are added as explanatory variables. All variables are sample averages.
Among the economic explanatory variables, the income level stands out as
the most significant, but only when rich countries are included in the sample.
Note that, perhaps a bit surprisingly, the long-term indebtness statistics do
not have a significant eﬀect on the likelihood of repayment. Neither does
the fraction of tax revenues spent on interest payments. In fact, Reinhart,
Rogoﬀ and Savastano (2003) have already pointed out that more than half of
debt defaults occurred in countries that would have satisfied the Maastricht
criterion of a debt to GNP ratio below 60%. Higher average growth rates
and higher stocks of international reserves relative to imports reduce the like-
lihood of default, although the eﬀects are not always significant. The only
variable that remains statistically significant throughout is the parliamen-
tary dummy variable. The full sample results suggest that a parliamentary
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Constitution reduces the likelihood of a country defaulting during a 25 year
interval by 46 to 54 percentage points. In other words, 4/5 of the 63 per-
centage point diﬀerence between regimes in the unconditional probabilities
remains after controlling for economic conditions. To assess the magnitude
of this eﬀect consider the following example: the average presidential democ-
racy in the sample had a per capita income of about $1,950 during the last
quarter of the 20th century. The estimates suggest that the risk of default
of the representative presidential democracy if its Constitution required the
executive to co-opt the support of the Congress to remain in power would be
the same as for a presidential democracy with a per capita income level of
$15,000 - which roughly corresponds to the average income level of Ireland
during the period. 9 10
[Table 3 about here]
[Table 4 about here]
3.2 Time Variation
To infer whether the pattern above is robust and there is evidence of a causal
relation between the form of government and debt reschedulings the sample
was split into successive five year periods. This leaves us with a total of 336
9Based on estimates of the first specification in Table 3.
10Summerhill (2005) argues that the fast development of credit markets in 19th cen-
tury Brazil and the low risk premia on debt instruments at the time can be traced back
to the empowerment of the enfranchised elite by the Emperor, through the Monarchic
Constitution of 1824.
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observations. All economic explanatory variables are lagged and represent
averages over the previous five year interval. Economic variables do appear to
carry some more predictive power over these shorter horizons: default is more
likely for countries that struggle to grow, are more indebted and poorer. The
latter two variables, however, are not always significant at the 5% confidence
level when OECDmembers are dropped from the sample. Note that, as there
is no variation in the form of government during the sampling period, fixed-
eﬀects cannot be included. Continental dummy variables for Latin America,
Africa and Asia, and time dummies were also included to capture regional
variations and changes in international credit conditions. The coeﬃcients
on the time dummies capture a significant reduction in defaults during the
1990s.
Table 6 reports the results of the pooled logit estimation using alternative
specifications. Once more, countries in which the government requires the
consent of the legislature are found to be significantly less likely to default on
external debts. These eﬀect amounts to a marginal reduction between 7 and
11.5 percentage points in the probability of default for the average country.
Again, this is hardly negligible given that the average likelihood of default
over a 5 year span is 21%.
[Table 5 about here]
[Table 6 about here]
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4 Propensity Score Matching
The main objection to the results reported in the previous section is that the
selection of Constitutions may not be random. Parliamentary and presiden-
tial democracies have diﬀerent origins and may well diﬀer in other aspects as
well. For instance, parliamentary democracies typically have higher income
levels and are older democracies than presidential democracies. This may
raise doubts about whether causality has been established above. In fact,
only two developed democracies are not parliamentary: Switzerland and the
United States. These are hardly the typical cases of presidential regimes in
our sample. In particular, the United States has enjoyed a unique mone-
tary and geopolitical position during the sample period and has a system of
checks and balances on the executive in place which is hardly the norm in
other presidential countries. This asymmetry of cases constitutes an addi-
tional diﬃculty for an econometric test, as we are confronted with the task
of identifying which eﬀects are explained by forms of government, income
levels or by whether the democracy is more mature. It is important to note
however, that if the proposition that markets in parliamentary countries have
a higher degree of immunization from debt crises is correct, one should cer-
tainly not expect to observe the same proportion of forms of government
across diﬀerent income groups - since the incidence of debt crises belongs to
the determinants of well-being in a country (see Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2004)).
A market that is aﬄicted by the serial default phenomenon will probably not
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provide an economic environment in which long-term credit markets might
thrive. So, while the skeptical will take this disproportion of parliamentary
democracies among rich countries as a fundamental flaw of the dataset, those
who are sympathetic to the proposition might interpret this disproportion as
an additional confirmation of the theory. The findings of Rosenbaum and
Rubin (1983) suggest that we should not stop at this point of the discussion.
The selection of Constitutions depends on a number of observable vari-
ables, allowing us to resort to quasi-experimental evidence (for an earlier
example in this context see Persson and Tabellini (2002)). In the first stage
we estimate the probability of a country to select a parliamentary form of
government as a function of observable historical and geographical factors.
Namely, we can observe whether the country has been colonized by the United
Kingdom, the fraction of the population speaking one of the five major Eu-
ropean languages as their first language (denoted by eurfrac), the time since
independence (t_indep) and the geographical location (the latitude of the
capital city or continental dummy variables). As economic explanatory vari-
ables long-term characteristics such as the degree of exposure to international
trade (openness), the indebtness statistics and per capita income are used.
Once the propensity of each country to adopt a parliamentary Constitution
has been computed, we are able perform estimates using only the countries
that are suﬃciently similar (the "twins") in terms of propensity score. The
cost of this method is that some observations which are too diﬀerent to be
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on the common support are dropped from the sample. Since observable dif-
ferences between treatment and control groups are ironed out however, such
cost might be worth paying.
Table 7 reports the results based on the nearest-neighbour, radius and
kernel matching techniques for three diﬀerent propensity score logit specifi-
cations. Bootstrapping was used to estimate the standard errors (with 10,000
replications). The results suggest that parliamentary countries are less likely
to default on external debts, even when we restrict our comparison to democ-
racies with similar characteristics. This eﬀect amounts to between 46 and
58 percentage points in the probability of default over the sample period,
which is in line with the finding of the previous section. In other words, the
matching estimates suggest that by including a confidence requirement in
their Constitution, the group of presidential countries would see the prob-
ability of default in a 25 year interval reduced from 79.3% to between 21%
and 33%. 11 This is still higher than the 16.3% default rate observed for
parliamentary democracies in the sample.
[Table 7 about here]
11Which compares with 25 to 33% in the cross-sectional logit analysis.
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5 Debt Reversals
A further test of the theory comes from comparing how countries with diﬀer-
ent political institutions reacted to episodes in which debt repayment meant
a great eﬀort for the borrowing country. 12 For this test, I use Reinhart,
Rogoﬀ and Savastano’s list of 22 episodes of sharp debt reductions between
1970 and 2000, defined as decreases in the external debt to GNP ratio of at
least 25% over a 36 month interval. Six of these involved countries that were
described as not free at the time (Freedom House). Table 8 lists the remain-
ing 16 cases according to the form of government. The table is consistent
with our earlier findings. Only two of the eleven presidential democracies
did not reduce their indebtness by resorting to a default. Among the five
cases that involved parliamentary democracies the opposite pattern can be
observed. Only Jamaica did default. Botswana in 1976-79, Malaysia in 1986-
89, Papua New Guinea in 1992-95 and finally Thailand in 1998-01 managed
to massively reduce debt stocks without changing the forms of repayment dic-
tated by original contracts. At the time of the debt reversals, these countries
did not share many common characteristics apart from being parliamentary
democracies. Despite the small size of the sample, the hypothesis that the
12Note that the theory suggests that political institutions will only be relevant for debt
policy when there exists some divergence on whether the optimal policy is to service debt or
to default (and eventually reschedule). It is highly plausible for instance that in the cases
where international transfers are positive, there is an unanimity in favour of continuing
debt servicing. If all political actors however have the same preferences regarding what the
optimal policy might be, the outcome would be the same whatever the decision making
institution.
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proportion of defaulters is unaﬀected by the form of government is easily
rejected at the 5% confidence level (t-statistic 2.75).
[Table 8 about here]
Among the seven parliamentary democracies that did reschedule their
external liabilities during the 25 years that this study covers, the case of
Turkey (the largest country in this group) is particularly revealing. During
the 1970s the Turkish political environment was highly volatile with a suc-
cession of short-lived coalition governments. Eventually, an early popular
election - that had been rescheduled from October to June 1977 - turned
out to be inconclusive. Led by a temporary "care-taker" government, the
country defaulted on its external debts in the following month. Arguably,
given the circumstances and the absence of credible alternatives, the checks
on this government were weaker as the risk of a no-confidence motion at the
time was very low.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper finds broad support for the prediction that parliamentary democ-
racies are less likely to default on their external liabilities. The eﬀect is
quantitatively large and holds true irrespective of whether the sample in-
cludes OECD economies or not. It is important to stress that the theory
does not predict that a presidential country will always default earlier than
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a parliamentary democracy. What it does say is that over a long period of
time or in a cross-section, as the one of this paper, one should observe less
discontinuances in debt contracts in countries with a parliamentary Consti-
tution. In principle, the theory should extend to the case of domestic debt
reschedulings.
Rather than resulting from the form of government per se, the failure
of some countries to repay as originally contracted is related to the inexis-
tence of a representative committee that decides on debt policy. The decision
structure found in parliamentary democracies mimics, to some extent, the
role such a committee would play. Future research might focus on institu-
tional reforms that could strengthen commitments and better insulate credit
markets from political developments that are the crux of any democratic
process.
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DATA SOURCES
col_uk: indicator of whether a country was colonized by the UK. Wacziarg
(1996) and Persson and Tabellini (2003).
col_uka: col_uk*(250 - t_indep)/250. Wacziarg (1996).
default indicator: Standard and Poor’s.
eurfrac: fraction of population speaking English, French, German, Span-
ish or Portuguese as first language. For new democracies that were formed
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through secession, linguistic data of the country from which the secession
occurred were imputed. Hall and Jones (1999).
latitude: latitude of the capital city of the country divided by 90. Hall and
Jones (1999).
parliamentary dummy: indicator of whether the executive needs the con-
fidence of the legislature to remain in power. Persson and Tabellini (2003).
Lebanon, Morocco and Panama were classified as having a presidential form
of government.
per capita income, GDP growth, interest payments/revenues, debt/GNP,
international reserves/imports: WDI database. Central government
debt data were complemented with data from the OECD yearbook (sam-
ple period averages).
openness: from the WDI database (WDI. NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS–Trade (%
of GDP) ).
substantial default indicator: Detragiache and Spilimbergo (2001).
t_indep: number of years since independence of the country.
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Table 1
Debt Repayment in Democracies: 1976-2000
Worldwide ( N=72 )
presidential parliamentary ratio
A B A/B
No. of countries 29 43
% with substantial default incident 65.5 7.0 9.4
% with default incident 79.3 16.3 4.9
Non-OECD ( N=47 )
presidential parliamentary ratio
No. of countries 25 22
% with substantial default incident 68.0 13.6 5.0
% with default incident 84.0 31.8 2.6
Non-LatAm ( N=49 )
presidential parliamentary ratio
No. of countries 11 38
% with substantial default incident 27.3 5.3 5.2
% with default incident 63.6 13.2 4.8
Non-LatAm & Non-OECD ( N = 26 )
presidential parliamentary ratio
No. of countries 11 15
% with substantial default incident 54.5 6.7 8.2
% with default incident 72.7 20.0 3.6
Debt Repayment in Democracies: 1880-1913 ( N=21 )
presidential parliamentary ratio
No. of countries 9 12
% with default incident 55.6 8.3 6.7
Debt Repayment in Democracies: 1919-1938 ( N=21 )
presidential parliamentary ratio
No. of countries 7 14
% with default incident 57.1 14.3 4.0
Table 2
Pre-WWII Debt History: 1880-1913 and 1919-1938
Defaulters Compliers
Presidential Costa Rica Switzerland
Honduras United States
Chile
Bolivia
Parliamentary Greece Australia
New Zealand
Canada
UK
France
Belgium
Norway
South Africa
Spain
Japan
Countries with Polity score > 0 were considered democratic.
Default history from Lindert and Morton (1989) and Suter (1990).
Table 3
Summary statistics - 25 year averages
observations average std. dev. min max
Defaulters 72 0.417 0.496 0 1
Parliamentary 72 0.597 0.494 0 1
Latin America 72 0.319 0.470 0 1
Log (p.c. income) 72 3.684 0.559 2.48 4.62
GDP growth 72 3.361 1.873 -0.31 8.98
Trade openess (trade/GDP in %) 72 74.252 47.513 16.59 328.57
Debt/GDP 72 58.586 52.397 3.32 410.73
Latitude (normalized) 71 0.341 0.190 0.02 0.71
European lang. speaking pop. (%) 71 0.432 0.438 0 1
former British colony 72 0.333 0.475 0 1
Table 4
Dependent variable: Default indicator dummy
WORLD Non-OECD Non-LatAm Non-Latam&Non-OECD
parliamentary -0.540 -0.463 -0.543 -0.563 -0.460 -0.540 -0.309 -0.273 -0.309 -0.724 -0.839 -0.730
2.73*** 2.20** 2.68*** 2.84*** 2.06** 2.70*** 1.97** 1.87* 1.96** 2.12** 1.83* 2.11**
Latin America 0.211 0.227 0.221 0.068 0.07 0.079
1.1 1.14 1.1 0.34 0.32 0.4
log (p.c. income) -0.608 -0.598 -0.617 -0.284 -0.097 -0.293 -0.34 -0.307 -0.340 -0.392 -0.114 -0.387
3.45*** 3.32*** 3.38*** 1.23 0.36 1.30 2.56** 2.27** 2.54** 1.28 0.36 1.25
GDP growth -0.074 -0.062 -0.075 -0.09 -0.081 -0.088 -0.042 -0.035 -0.042 -0.116 -0.134 -0.115
1.57 1.26 1.54 1.89* 1.51 1.84* 1.40 1.23 1.38 1.76* 1.72* 1.76*
Trade openess -0.003 -0.006 -0.002 -0.010
0.98 1.69* 1.09 2.33**
debt/GDP 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000
0.76 0.63 0.02 0.11
Countries 72 72 72 49 49 49 49 49 49 26 26 26
Pseudo R2 0.52 0.53 0.53 0.35 0.41 0.36 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.35 0.49 0.35
Log likelihood -23.46 -22.97 -23.20 -21.15 -19.35 -20.97 -13.51 -12.94 -13.51 -11.65 -9.23 -11.65
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
alternative specifications with interest payments/revenues or reserves/imports available upon request
Table 5
Summary statistics - 5 year averages
observations average std. dev. min max
Defaulters 336 0.211 0.409 0 1
Parliamentary 336 0.601 0.490 0 1
Log (p.c. income) 336 8.492 1.324 5.42 10.83
GDP growth 336 3.413 2.887 -8.99 15.99
Debt/GDP 336 0.583 0.711 0.02 8.31
Trade openess (trade/GDP in %) 336 0.7519 0.491 0.13 3.33
Interest payments/Revenue 304 13.370 10.727 0.35 86.58
Intl. reserves/Imports 328 0.483 0.386 0.01 3.26
Latin America 336 0.330 0.471 0 1
Asia 336 0.134 0.341 0 1
Africa 336 0.080 0.272 0 1
Table 6 - I.V. estimation (5 year averages)
Dependent variable: Default indicator dummy
WORLD Non-OECD
parliamentary -0.115 -0.097 -0.164 -0.082 -0.080 -0.085 -0.070 -0.247 -0.266 -0.356 -0.288 -0.192 -0.271 -0.228
3.03*** 3.19*** 4.88*** 3.11*** 2.61*** 3.00*** 2.74*** 3.05*** 3.31*** 5.15*** 3.35*** 2.39** 3.33*** 2.61***
log (p.c. income) -0.067 -0.053 -0.052 -0.028 -0.051 -0.031 -0.017 -0.098 -0.092 -0.060 -0.054 -0.081 -0.063 -0.025
2.73*** 3.06*** 3.81*** 1.75* 3.22*** 1.83* 1.37 2.25** 2.17** 1.64 1.27 2.06** 1.49 0.73
GDP growth -0.018 -0.014 -0.019 -0.012 -0.012 -0.011 -0.010 -0.040 -0.036 -0.047 -0.042 -0.031 -0.035 -0.034
3.64*** 3.19*** 3.75*** 2.86*** 3.00*** 2.81*** 2.83*** 4.01*** 3.50*** 4.26*** 3.60*** 3.09*** 3.36*** 3.25***
Debt/GDP 0.050 0.037 0.047 0.023 0.040 0.043 0.025 0.094 0.083 0.092 0.063 0.094 0.114 0.074
2.28** 2.34** 2.48** 2.21** 2.38** 2.59*** 2.20** 2.05** 1.95* 1.84* 1.74* 1.98** 2.32** 1.99**
Interest paym./Revenues 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001
0.23 0.32 0.27 0.57
Trade openess -0.043 -0.022 -0.177 -0.141
1.14 0.62 1.82* 1.26
Intl. reserves/Imports 0.007 -0.005 0.015 -0.037
0.3 0.27 0.23 0.54
Time dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional dummies Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 336 336 336 304 336 328 299 218 218 218 189 218 213 187
Countries 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 46 46 46 46 46 46 46
Defaults 0.211 0.211 0.211 0.194 0.211 0.207 0.194 0.312 0.312 0.312 0.296 0.312 0.305 0.294
Pseudo R2 0.391 0.468 0.515 0.585 0.518 0.538 0.602 0.276 0.385 0.423 0.503 0.433 0.445 0.527
Log likelihood -105.53 -92.25 -84.05 -62.15 -83.49 -77.34 -58.58 -97.94 -83.22 -78.03 -57.07 -76.65 -72.73 -53.54
Robust z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 7
Defaulting democracies and constitutions: matching estimates 1976-2000
Nearest N. Caliper Kernel Nearest N. Caliper Kernel Nearest N. Caliper Kernel
parliamentary -0.552 -0.555 -0.552 -0.500 -0.464 -0.586 -0.473 -0.516 -0.500
2.62*** 2.54** 2.62*** 2.32** 2.04** 2.571*** 1.94* 2.13** 2.07**
no. of observations 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71
...on common support 66 64 66 65 61 62 66 59 62
logit specification: A A A B B B C C C
logit A: eurfrac, t_indep, latitude, log (pc income)
logit B: col_uka, LatAm, debt/GDP, openess
logit C: col_uk, t_indep, latitude, openess
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 8
Debt Reversals 1970-2000
Defaulters Compliers
Presidential 81.8% 18.1%
Morocco 85-88 South Korea 85-88
Philippines 86-89 Egypt 87-90
Costa Rica 87-90
Bolivia 88-91
Panama 89-92
Jordan 91-94
Albania 92-95
Bulgaria 92-95
Russia 99-02
Parliamentary 20% 80%
Jamaica 90-93 Botswana 76-79
Malaysia 86-89
Papua NG 92-95
Thailand 98-01
Cases listed in Reihart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003) involving 
non-free countries: Gabon 1978, Chile and Swaziland 1985,  
Paraguay 1987, Lebanon 1990 and Iran 1993.
Forms of Government and Default History
parliamentary default default substantial def. parliamentary default default substantial def. parliamentary default default substantial def.
constitution ? pre-WWII 1976-2000 1976-2000 constitution ? pre-WWII 1976-2000 1976-2000 constitution ? pre-WWII 1976-2000 1976-2000
Argentina No Yes Yes Yes Germany Yes Yes No No Norway Yes No No No
Australia Yes No No No Ghana No -- Yes No Pakistan No -- Yes No
Austria Yes Yes No No Greece Yes Yes No No Panama No Yes Yes Yes
Bahamas Yes -- No No Guatemala No Yes Yes Yes Papua NG Yes -- No No
Barbados Yes -- No No Honduras No Yes Yes Yes Paraguay No Yes Yes Yes
Belgium Yes No No No Hungary Yes Yes No No Peru No Yes Yes Yes
Belize Yes -- No No Iceland Yes -- No No Philippines No -- Yes Yes
Bolivia No Yes Yes No India Yes -- No No Poland Yes -- Yes No
Botswana Yes -- No No Ireland Yes -- No No Portugal Yes Yes No No
Brasil No Yes Yes Yes Israel Yes -- No No Russia No Yes Yes No
Bulgaria Yes Yes Yes No Italy Yes No No No Senegal No -- Yes Yes
Canada Yes No No No Jamaica Yes -- Yes No Singapore Yes -- No No
Chile No Yes Yes Yes Japan Yes No No No South Africa Yes No Yes No
Colombia No Yes No Yes Jordan No -- Yes Yes South Korea No -- No Yes
Costa Rica No Yes Yes Yes Lebanon No -- No No Spain Yes No No No
Cyprus No -- No No Luxembourg Yes No No No Sweden Yes No No No
Czech Rep. Yes -- No No Malaysia Yes -- No No Switzerland No No No No
Denmark Yes No No No Malta Yes -- No No Thailand Yes No No Yes
Dominican No Yes Yes Yes Mauritius Yes -- No No Trinidad&T. Yes -- Yes Yes
Ecuador No Yes Yes Yes Mexico No Yes Yes Yes Turkey Yes No Yes No
El Salvador No Yes No Yes Morocco No -- Yes Yes U.K. Yes No No No
Fiji Yes -- No No Netherlands Yes No No No USA No No No No
Finland Yes -- No No New Zealand Yes No No No Uruguay No Yes Yes No
France Yes No No No Nicaragua No Yes Yes Yes Venezuela No Yes Yes Yes
Pre-WWII data are from Lindert and Morton (1989) and Suter (1990).
Data Appendix - 1976-2000
log (p.c GDP openess Debt/ European col col latit. t_
income) growth GDP speaking _uk _uka indep
Argentina 3.85 2.02 16.59 43.55 0.836 0.00 0.00 0.41 183
Australia 4.26 3.32 35.00 17.77 0.950 1.00 0.61 0.36 98
Austria 4.41 2.53 74.88 59.40 0.980 0.00 0.00 0.54 250
Bahamas 4.10 4.39 129.62 10.50 0.865 1.00 0.90 0.27 26
Barbados 3.83 1.99 115.80 32.29 1.000 1.00 0.87 0.15 33
Belgium 4.38 2.26 131.66 95.03 0.345 0.00 0.00 0.56 169
Belize 3.36 5.10 119.61 42.84 0.940 1.00 0.93 0.20 18
Bolivia 2.96 2.06 51.64 102.28 0.372 0.00 0.00 0.17 174
Botswana 3.39 8.98 108.47 19.85 0.000 1.00 0.87 0.24 33
Brazil 3.62 3.03 17.49 33.03 0.998 0.00 0.00 0.22 177
Bulgaria 3.19 0.23 85.99 60.98 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.47 91
Canada 4.26 2.93 58.27 52.68 0.857 1.00 0.47 0.49 132
Chile 3.52 5.71 54.08 68.27 0.931 0.00 0.00 0.37 189
Colombia 3.31 3.56 31.61 33.86 0.980 0.00 0.00 0.05 189
Costa Rica 3.49 4.25 74.93 60.76 0.906 0.00 0.00 0.11 178
Cyprus 3.95 6.64 105.15 88.35 0.000 1.00 0.84 0.39 39
Czech Rep. 3.70 -0.10 109.05 34.53 0.013 0.00 0.00 0.55 6
Denmark 4.49 2.00 66.20 71.88 0.005 0.00 0.00 0.62 250
Dominican R. 3.16 4.26 58.96 44.34 0.871 0.00 0.00 0.21 155
Ecuador 3.18 2.92 53.00 79.66 0.714 0.00 0.00 0.02 177
El Salvador 3.19 1.77 56.41 37.16 0.923 1.00 0.29 0.15 178
Fiji 3.37 2.82 104.61 24.28 0.008 1.00 0.88 0.20 29
Finland 4.37 2.60 58.14 48.48 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.67 82
France 4.38 2.31 43.46 42.05 1.004 0.00 0.00 0.54 250
Germany 4.43 2.18 52.25 31.18 0.949 0.00 0.00 0.54 250
Ghana 2.56 2.80 40.64 61.32 0.000 1.00 0.83 0.07 42
Greece 4.03 1.97 45.46 105.11 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.42 170
Guatemala 3.16 3.14 40.78 25.05 0.588 0.00 0.00 0.16 178
Honduras 2.85 3.68 72.68 85.03 0.845 0.00 0.00 0.16 178
Hungary 3.65 1.40 78.58 56.72 0.005 0.00 0.00 0.53 250
Iceland 4.39 3.35 69.72 40.94 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.71 55
India 2.48 5.20 18.25 21.20 0.000 1.00 0.79 0.28 52
Ireland 4.16 5.05 117.63 80.72 0.742 1.00 0.69 0.61 78
Israel 4.13 4.24 90.57 222.66 0.000 1.00 0.80 0.36 51
Italy 4.22 2.38 43.89 79.85 0.006 0.00 0.00 0.50 250
Jamaica 3.32 0.53 96.76 109.91 0.940 1.00 0.85 0.20 37
Japan 4.55 3.12 21.23 44.67 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.40 250
Jordan 3.22 6.23 120.63 101.88 0.000 1.00 0.83 0.35 43
log (p.c GDP openess Debt/ European col col latit. t_
income) growth GDP speaking _uk _uka indep
Lebanon 3.40 5.48 79.77 33.48 0.00 0.00 0.37 46
Luxembourg 4.53 4.51 211.39 3.32 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.55 160
Malaysia 3.49 6.94 136.24 46.41 0.000 1.00 0.83 0.04 42
Malta 3.80 5.87 177.75 41.28 0.000 1.00 0.86 0.40 35
Mauritius 3.44 5.61 116.44 42.57 0.567 1.00 0.88 0.22 31
Mexico 3.51 3.46 36.18 45.04 0.880 0.00 0.00 0.19 189
Morocco 3.09 3.77 54.87 77.92 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.37 43
Netherlands 4.38 2.56 105.28 59.32 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.58 250
New Zeland 4.19 1.74 57.79 51.19 0.900 1.00 0.63 0.41 92
Nicaragua 2.77 -0.31 69.51 410.73 0.655 0.00 0.00 0.14 178
Norway 4.45 3.27 74.20 24.82 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.67 94
Pakistan 2.61 5.39 34.53 44.99 0.000 1.00 0.79 0.35 52
Panama 3.45 3.18 75.80 94.62 0.805 0.00 0.00 0.10 96
Papua NG 2.95 2.93 93.29 63.07 0.015 1.00 0.90 0.07 24
Paraguay 3.25 4.33 57.43 32.46 0.036 0.00 0.00 0.28 188
Peru 3.37 1.85 33.54 70.07 0.564 0.00 0.00 0.13 178
Philippines 3.04 3.05 63.21 64.12 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.15 53
Poland 3.46 3.70 50.93 48.84 0.040 0.00 0.00 0.56 81
Portugal 3.95 3.44 63.16 55.40 1.000 0.00 0.00 0.43 250
Russia 3.48 -0.14 54.66 26.51 0.007 0.00 0.00 0.62 250
Senegal 2.75 2.80 69.25 73.13 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.16 39
Singapore 4.21 7.71 328.57 76.92 0.089 1.00 0.86 0.02 34
South Africa 3.62 1.68 49.59 17.82 0.090 1.00 0.64 0.32 89
South Korea 3.85 7.30 66.02 32.16 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.42 51
Spain 4.11 2.58 39.03 47.18 0.728 0.00 0.00 0.42 250
Sweden 4.40 1.79 64.61 52.43 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.66 250
Switzerland 4.62 1.45 70.02 21.51 0.840 0.00 0.00 0.53 250
Thailand 3.26 6.69 66.74 42.15 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.15 250
Trinidad&Tob 3.64 2.93 81.97 33.95 0.965 1.00 0.85 0.12 37
Turkey 3.39 3.93 31.85 35.60 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.46 250
Uk 4.23 2.33 53.47 40.88 0.974 0.00 0.00 0.57 250
Uruguay 3.71 2.36 40.45 40.80 1.000 0.00 0.00 0.39 171
USA 4.39 3.31 20.10 46.91 0.972 0.00 0.00 0.38 250
Venezuela 3.57 1.66 48.81 50.59 0.969 0.00 0.00 0.11 188
